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Religion, Resources, and
Representation
Three Narratives of Faith
Engagement in British Urban
Governance
Adam Dinham
Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Vivien Lowndes
De Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom
Faith groups are increasingly regarded as important civil society participants in
British urban governance. Faith engagement is linked to policies of social inclu-
sion and “community cohesion,” particularly in the context of government con-
cerns about radicalization along religious lines. Primary research is drawn upon
in developing a critical and explicitly multifaith analysis of faith involvement. A
narrative approach is used to contrast the different perspectives of national pol-
icy makers, local stakeholders, and faith actors themselves. The narratives serve
to illuminate not only this specific case but also the more general character of
British urban governance as it takes on a more “decentered” form with greater
blurring of boundaries between the public, private, and personal.
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British policy makers increasingly see faith groups as important civilsociety participants in urban governance. At regional, city, and neigh-
borhood levels, faith groups are becoming involved in forms of cogovernance
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(including formal partnerships and informal networks) alongside elected and
appointed politicians, community representatives, and commercial interests.
Faith groups are also being targeted as partners in “civil renewal,” a policy
agenda to stimulate and support volunteering and community leadership—as
assets in their own right and as part of a broader process of capacity building
(Blunkett 2004). In addition, faith groups are seen as having an important role
in the delivery of urban services—whether through prestige projects, such as
the new “city academies,” (secondary schools) or a multitude of neighborhood-
level coproduction initiatives (such as elders’ lunch clubs, child care facilities,
and community development projects).
In British urban governance, faith involvement is linked to policies of
social inclusion: It is seen in part as a route into hard-to-reach minority
communities. Faith groups have been seen by government as key agents in
promoting “community cohesion” in the wake of the 2001 disturbances in
the north of England and the associated critique of multiculturalist public
policy, seen by some as condoning “parallel lives” among different ethnic
communities (Cantle 2005). Post-9/11 and the London bombings in 2005
(7/7), government concern about radicalization within minority communi-
ties has added a new urgency to the strategy. In contrast to the United
States, engagement with religious groups is associated in British policy dis-
course as much if not more with minority faiths as with Christian churches.
This article draws on primary research to take a critical and explicitly
cross-faith look at the dynamics of faith involvement in urban governance.
Focusing on cogovernance initiatives (rather than faith-based service deliv-
ery), the research reveals the absence of any shared paradigm.1 Different
stakeholders—national policy makers, local partners, and faith groups
themselves—tell quite different stories about faith engagement in urban
governance. Differences relate not simply to matters of detail (how much,
how often, by what means) but to the underlying rationale and purpose of
faith involvement. We use the concept of narrative to refer to these distinct
and contrasting attempts to link ideas, actions, and institutions within the
governance arena (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006; Bevir 2005).
The article starts with a discussion of policies to engage faith groups in
British urban governance. It goes on to problematize the idea of a “faith
sector,” seeking to specify the different actors and roles implicated by these
policies. The main part of the article is an exposition of three contrasting
narratives of faith engagement, based upon resources, religion, and repre-
sentation. The analysis highlights the significance of differences in perspec-
tive between actors and their implications for policy and practice. The
narratives serve to illuminate not only the particular case of faith engagement
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but also the more general character of British urban governance as it takes
on an increasingly “decentered” form (Bevir and Rhodes, 2001), in which
boundaries between the public, private, and personal become ever more
blurred (Newman 2005, 2007).
Faiths and Civil Society in Britain
Most research on faith and civic engagement comes from the United States
and is concerned with Christian churches (see Burns, Schlozman, and Verba
2001; Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In Britain, the inter-
section of secularism and multiculturalism creates a unique context.
Christianity is the main religion in Britain (72%); people with no religion
make up 15% of the population; 5% of the population belong to a non-
Christian denomination (half of whom are Muslims) (Office of National
Statistics 2004). Just 10% of British people attend church regularly, with atten-
dance more common among women and middle-class people. However, atten-
dance is growing in some urban areas, particularly among Black-led and
Pentecostal churches. But despite small congregations, the Church of England
remains a strong focus for community activity within many localities.
The religious makeup of some British cities varies considerably from the
national profile. In Leicester, for instance, 45% of people identified them-
selves as Christian, 15% as Hindu, 11% as Muslim, and 17% as having no
religion.2 The relationship between faith and ethnicity is complicated: In
Leicester, the Indian community has Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Jain ele-
ments, while the Muslim community includes citizens whose origins are in
countries in Asia, Africa, and East/Central Europe.
Despite debates about secularization, religion remains an important
arena for civic participation and volunteering in Britain. Of respondents to
the U.K. Home Office’s Citizenship Survey, 23% have participated in vol-
unteering in a faith-based context (Home Office, 2005a). Such volunteering
is of proportionately greater significance for women than men and for
minority ethnic groups vis-à-vis White citizens (63% of Black people and
59% of Asian people) (Home Office, 2005a). Taking all volunteering activ-
ity, religious affiliation itself does not make much difference, but those who
actively practice a religion are more likely than others to volunteer. The
same pattern can be seen in terms of civic engagement more generally,
including participation in consultations and lobbying and involvement in
decision-making bodies (Home Office 2005a; National Council for Voluntary
Organisations 2007).
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Among faith groups, individual commitments are matched by collective
endeavor in the urban arena. A survey conducted in Greater London identi-
fied more than 2,000 faith-based social action projects in the city, employing
3,000 people, supported by 13,500 volunteers, with 120,000 beneficiaries.
The total figures are likely to be far higher, given that the response rate from
worshipping communities was just under 30% (London Churches Group
2002). A similar study in Leicester identified 250 faith groups supporting 450
different social projects (with a response rate of 67%) (Leicester City Council
2004). Such projects address a wide range of issues (homelessness, racism,
crime, drug and alcohol abuse, health, skill development, and culture) and
user groups (elders, children, and young people; hard-to-reach communities)
(Northwest Regional Development Agency 2005; Dinham 2007).
Faith Engagement in Urban Governance:
The Policy Context
The British government’s interest in involving faith groups in urban gov-
ernance has grown from the early 1990s. This has taken place in the con-
text of a broader agenda for partnership and democratic renewal at the local
level, together with a perception that faith communities have been under-
represented in governance arrangements aimed at facilitating civil society
engagement. As late as 2000, a government report referred critically to “the
invisibility of faith communities in public life” (New Deal for Communities
2000, 6). Faith groups are increasingly called upon to become actors in
what Gerry Stoker calls “networked community governance,” in contrast to
both traditional elected local government and “new public management”
(Stoker 2004, 11). The distinctive character of this form of urban gover-
nance lies in its broad repertoire of delivery mechanisms, which seeks to
combine the diverse knowledge and resources of stakeholders in the public,
business, and community spheres (Stoker 2004, 11).3
The organic growth of local partnerships in the early ’90s has been sup-
plemented (or even overridden) by the push under Labour governments since
1997 to promote stakeholder collaboration in urban governance (and public
policy more generally). At least 5,500 local partnership bodies were esti-
mated to exist in 2002, spending approximately £4.3 billion a year and focus-
ing on issues including health, social care, crime prevention, housing, and
environmental sustainability (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, 24-27). In 2001,
the government established a new tier of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs),
charged with the strategic oversight of this burgeoning partnership activity.
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LSPs are required to make specific efforts to involve and consult faith
communities, and a survey in 2004 found that faith representatives were
involved in 71% of LSPs and part of the core membership in 46% (Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister 2005). A report for the Church Urban Fund has
recently argued that LSPs are “the only form of local public partnership that
has really endorsed the concept of ‘faith representatives’ being there to rep-
resent the constituency of local faith communities” (Church Urban Fund
2006, 3). A contrast is drawn with experience in the National Health Service,
where some nonexecutive directors on primary care trusts are identified as
faith representatives but tend to see themselves as “people of faith” rather
than spokespeople for a specific constituency (Church Urban Fund 2006, 3).
City councils have been encouraged to include faith communities in local
compacts with the voluntary and community sectors and in consultations on
local services—from education to policing (Lowndes and Chapman 2006).
Faith engagement in neighborhood-level governance structures has also
become a feature of some urban regeneration programmes (Neighbourhood
Renewal Unit 2004; Local Government Association 2002). At the regional
level, multifaith forums have been established, providing a source of repre-
sentation on regional assemblies as well as opportunities for networking
between different cities.
The push to bring faith groups into the partnership fold relates to a per-
ception among policy makers of untapped resources in relation to community
leadership and representation, community knowledge, and community assets.
This has been linked particularly (but not exclusively) to improving the gov-
ernance and welfare of minority communities and to strategies to improve
community cohesion across ethnic lines (Home Office 2005b; Community
Cohesion Panel 2004; Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007). But,
more broadly, the government sees faith groups as important players in its
efforts to foster active citizenship and community development.4
But the engagement of faith groups in urban governance is not simply a
top-down policy agenda. Faith bodies themselves have entered the policy
debate to highlight the important role they play in supporting urban com-
munities (Commission on Urban Life and Faith 2006). The Commission on
Urban Life and Faith (led by the Church of England but including other
faiths) has recently argued that “faithful capital” is of increasing signifi-
cance in the context of “rapidly increasing ethnic and cultural diversity”
and the current “heightened fear of the stranger” (Commission on Urban
Life and Faith 2006, 1). Responding to these changing contexts builds upon
a long history of faith involvement in urban social action—from the insti-
tutional provision of services (in education, housing, and social care) to
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volunteering and charitable giving. Such activity is inspired, even required,
by diverse faith traditions—including the Christian ideas of community and
love of neighbor, the Jewish practice of mizvah, the Muslim duty of zakat,
and the Hindu concept of seva.
Faith Engagement: Who, Where, and Why?
Engaging faith groups is clearly part of a broader “third way” govern-
ment strategy to mobilize the resources of civil society in pursuit of citizen
well-being and better governance (Giddens 1998). But there is also an
assumption that faith groups have special qualities that enable them to play
a distinctive role in urban governance. Rationales for faith group involve-
ment have rarely been spelled out; they have been implicit, sometimes con-
tradictory, and often downright opportunistic. Important questions remain
unanswered. Who in the faith sector is expected to do what—and why?
Indeed, is there any such entity as a faith sector, and how is it different from
the wider “voluntary and community sector”? Is it likely that faith groups
will wish to be involved in urban governance, and what sort of support
might they need? Are policy makers and local stakeholders equipped to
maximize the benefits and anticipate the pitfalls of faith engagement? This
article seeks to illuminate such issues.
Reflecting the current state of debate, we have so far used a variety of
different terms to describe faith involvement in urban governance. Terms
such as faith based, faith group, and faith community tend to be used inter-
changeably in the British policy debate. But it is important to try and iden-
tify the range of different actors and roles bundled up in these portmanteau
terms. This is the purpose of Table 1. Faith involvement in wider civil
society can be seen as taking place along a continuum that starts with faith
communities in a very general sense and moves through faith organizations,
faith networks, faith leadership, and faith representation. The roles identi-
fied do not, of course, exhaust the full repertoire of faith-based social
action, which (as we shall see later) may be far more broadly based than
policy makers envisage. Rather, Table 1 seeks to uncover who in the faith
sector is doing what and to draw parallels with the roles played in urban
governance by other, more familiar civil society actors (e.g., political par-
ties and voluntary and community organizations).
Table 1 is derived from original research undertaken for the U.K. Home
Office in Leicester—a city of 288,000 in the East Midlands region of England
(see Lowndes and Chapman 2006 for a full account). With its ethnically
6 Urban Affairs Review
diverse population and strong interfaith traditions, Leicester is not a typical
case study, but it does prove a useful “research laboratory” for testing out
conceptual tools. During 2005, 27 semistructured interviews were carried
out, and three meetings were observed. Respondents were national faith
leaders and civil servants, faith leaders, and activists in the city of Leicester
and practitioners in the local authority and police force.5
We set the Leicester research in context by drawing on additional pri-
mary research undertaken as part of a project on faith and social capital for
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, which was carried out in London, the
West Midlands, the Northwest, and Yorkshire (see Furbey et al. 2006). In
2005, 24 semistructured interviews were conducted, focusing on people
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Table 1
Mapping Faith Involvement in Civil Society and Public Policy
Examples from Leicester,
Faith Actors Role in Urban Governance United Kingdom
Faith communities Citizens Christians, Muslims, Hindus,
and others
Faith organizations Members (a) Places of worship
(b) Religious associations
(c) Federations of groups
(d) Community projects
Faith networks Intermediaries (a) Sector networks:
Faith Regeneration Network,
Regional Faith Forum
(b) Topic networks: dialogue
groups, including
Muslim-Christian Women’s
group, Muslim-Hindu group
Faith leaders Leaders (a) Formally constituted: Council
of Faiths
(b) Informally convened: Faith
Leaders’ Forum, Multicultural
Advisory Group
Faith representatives Partners (a) Service-based: advisory groups
for police, health, education,
etc.
(b) Governance-based: strategic
partnerships (LSP and regional)
Source: Adapted from Lowndes and Chapman 2005.
Note: LSP = Local Strategic Partnership.
identified as faith leaders (including clergy and laity) but also including
activists, service users, and other informal participants. There were also
nine group interviews, involving a total of 31 participants from 25 faith-
based organizations.6
The term faith community has been criticized on two fronts. First, the term
has “homogenizing” tendencies because it “fails to capture the diversity
between, and also importantly within, faiths,” and second, it is increasingly
replacing the term “black and ethnic minorities,” coming to refer to people of
minority faiths, indeed specifically (but not explicitly) to Muslims (National
Council for Voluntary Organisations 2007, 2). In the wake of 9/11 and the
subsequent London bombings, faith is being discursively constructed as a
property of the “Other.” Just as the concept of ethnicity has over time became
associated with minority communities, so too is faith coming to denote some-
thing outside the “norm” of Britishness. There is a current within public dis-
course in Britain in which only Muslims have faith—and a potentially
dangerous faith at that. As Ted Cantle (2007, 1) has recently speculated, “If
faith is the new race, is faithism the new racism?”
According to our typology, faith communities are understood as being
made up of individual citizens and their family and social networks who
have a religious identification or affiliation and may or may not take part in
regular worship (whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu, etc.). Faith communi-
ties are constituted through the “shared beliefs, values and practices” that
“bind people together, giving them a shared sense of belonging” (National
Council for Voluntary Organisations 2007, 2). Although faith identities are
transmitted in part through formal religious settings, they are also influ-
enced by common cultural references and “inherited” through family and
community membership. Faith communities are places where citizens can
take opportunities (and support) to become involved in civil society through
volunteering, befriending, and so on. Indeed, as seen above, levels of vol-
unteering are higher in Britain among those who actively practice a reli-
gion. But there is no link between religious affiliation per se and being an
active and engaged citizen.
Opportunities for active citizenship may be provided by or channeled through
faith organizations. These include places of worship (a church, mosque, or tem-
ple), religious associations (such as the Catholic Knights of St Columba), com-
munity projects (e.g., for older people), and federations of groups associated
with a particular religion (e.g., the Federation of Sikh Organizations in
Leicester). Citizens are members of faith organizations, as they may also be
members of other community groups or voluntary associations or of political
parties or trade unions.
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Faith organizations contribute to urban governance through the opportuni-
ties they offer their members for capacity building, community development,
and coproduction. As Furbey et al. (2006, 26) put it, “faith communities,
through their organizational structures, bring people together in associa-
tions that are developmental and strategic” (emphasis added). Such organi-
zational structures are diverse in scale and scope, ranging from religious
congregations and places of worship to semiprofessional and professional
organizations that employ staff, handle large budgets, and deliver a range of
urban services.
For any community body to exercise influence within urban governance
more widely conceived, it needs vehicles for the mobilization of citizens
beyond their immediate locale and specific interests. This is the role of faith
networks, which act as intermediaries between leaders and citizen-
members. Drawing on Chris Baker’s (2007, 5) distinction, we can see faith
communities as reservoirs of “spiritual capital” (theological identity, val-
ues, and moral vision), which is potentially—but not inevitably—a
resource for urban governance. An institutional infrastructure of faith orga-
nizations and networks is a prerequisite for spiritual capital to be converted
into “religious capital,” defined by Baker (2007, 5) as “the practical contri-
bution to local and national life made by faith groups.” Elsewhere, we have
identified the importance of civic infrastructure in determining whether
forms of social capital become mobilized as resources for urban gover-
nance (rather than simply sustaining the well-being of individual commu-
nities). Whether faith based or not, civic infrastructure refers to the formal
and informal mechanisms that link different community-based organiza-
tions one to another and provide channels for (two-way) communication
with citywide policy makers (Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2006).
Our research reveals that faith networks may be more or less formal and
may be present across the spectrum of actors or focused on a particular topic
or issue. (Leicester has a Faith Regeneration Network covering a full range of
community issues and five informal “dialogue groups,” including a Muslim-
Hindu group and a Christian-Muslim women’s group.) Some networks arise
organically in response to local needs and are galvanized by local activists;
others are creatures of government policy and funding (associated, for
instance, with the “community empowerment networks” established after
1998 in the 88 most disadvantaged urban areas in England). Some are hybrids
of both, starting life as organic networks and responding (or sometimes being
diverted) to policy needs. In either case, faith networks are potentially arenas
in which different faith organizations can exchange ideas and information,
argue about priorities, agree on positions, make alliances, and “do deals.”
Dinham, Lowndes / Faith Engagement in British Urban Governance 9
Faith networks are the organizational expression of the “constituency” served
by faith leaders and representatives. Here, they can find out the views of
member-citizens, playing a role in framing debate, mediating between differ-
ent viewpoints, brokering conflicts, and feeding back higher level decisions.
They may act as (imperfect) vehicles of accountability.
Such networks are the institutional equivalents to political parties, trade
councils, or councils of voluntary service; they are secondary associations
in the Durkheimian sense—arenas within which preferences are deliber-
ated, identities forged, and alliances negotiated. In Britain, political parties
and trade unions have declined (even collapsed) as important nodes of civil
society, that is as mass-membership organizations based upon face-to-face
community-based meetings (though they continue, of course, to play other
important roles in the polity and economy). Faith networks offer an arena
in which citizens of different ages, social classes, and ethnicities come
together to debate and arrive at common positions on a wide variety of top-
ics (they are not single-issue organizations). They may have an important
potential role to play in the “new collectivism” envisaged by British intel-
lectuals of the left (Crouch and Marquand 1995).
All faith groups have their own leadership arrangements, but what about
leaders of a broader faith sector engaged in urban governance? Our research
showed that faith leadership may be formally organized (e.g., the Leicester
Council of Faiths), with a constitution, subscriptions, and elected officers,
or informally convened (the Faith Leaders’ Forum and the Multicultural
Advisory Group), with a shifting membership and an ad hoc meeting
schedule. These bodies provide a vehicle through which the faith leadership
can be consulted on both an ongoing basis and on specific issues and inci-
dents (where informal forums are particularly helpful).
In our typology, leaders become faith representatives when they act as
partners in urban governance. Through their representatives on urban part-
nerships, members of faith communities are enabled to participate in the
planning and delivery of urban services—from consultation to cogover-
nance. In Leicester, for example, the Council of Faiths provides faith rep-
resentation on bodies such as the Education Committee of Leicester City
Council, the Leicestershire Faith and Health Forum, and the Police
Advisory Group on Race Issues. There is also a faith sector representative
on the LSP and the East Midlands Regional Assembly. The existence of
diverse and overlapping organizational arrangements is generally regarded
as a positive aspect of Leicester’s approach to faith involvement and as
playing an important role in sustaining good community relations. Our
research suggested that a range of different settings for dialogue, alongside
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multiple channels of communication, can maximize flexibility, responsive-
ness, and inclusion.
Agency and Narrative in Faith Engagement
Table 1 provides a useful means of locating agency within the amor-
phous and undifferentiated category of “faith,” but it should not be inter-
preted as implying a smooth conveyor belt from worship to governance.
The purpose of Table 1 is to open up the black box of faith—to look inside
at who does what and how this relates to public policy objectives. The activ-
ities and roles in Table 1 occur in parallel as well as in sequence, and there
may be disconnections as well as linkages between them.
Table 1 serves also to debunk the idea that faith communities per se can act
as partners in urban governance. Faith engagement in governance takes place
only through the exercise of agency—through the reflexive and context-
specific actions of individual citizens of faith, members of faith organiza-
tions and faith networks, faith leaders, and faith representatives. Believers
who attend a Hindu temple may also volunteer to organize a community
festival. Members of a Muslim women’s organization may make represen-
tations to the local council or join with other women’s groups in a local
campaign. A Catholic priest may preach to his congregation and run a lunch
club for local elders (of all or no faiths), while also being part of a neigh-
borhood forum or a citywide interfaith council. The Sikh chair of the inter-
faith council may sit on the board of the citywide LSP and be a member of
the regional faiths forum; at the same time, he or she may (or may not) play
an active role in the local gurdwara (Sikh temple) and associated neigh-
borhood activities.
None of these connections is necessary or inevitable. Inspired by decen-
tered conceptual models, we see governance as “the contingent product of
political struggles, embodying competing sets of beliefs” (Bevir 2005, 3).
Influenced by their own social context and narrative traditions, actors make
different links between beliefs, action, and the institutional environment
(Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 4). People of faith employ their own “local rea-
soning” (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 9) to confront the opportunities (and/or
threats) presented by the public policy agenda to engage with faith. Beliefs
and practices (including traditions of social action) vary within and between
different faith communities, which are also influenced by one another,
whether through opposition or collaboration. Public agency, including
engagement in urban governance, is differently “situated” (to use Bevir and
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Rhodes’ terminology) for British Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs,
and so on. Moreover, there are important differences of perspective within
the main faiths themselves, related to issues of doctrine, values, generation,
and gender. It is individuals, not institutions, who “act creatively for rea-
sons that make sense to them” (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 72), but such action
takes place in a specific social context.
Does recognition of this complexity preclude further analysis? No,
because it actually directs attention to an important insight, namely, “pat-
terns of governance arise as the contingent constructions of several actors
inspired by competing webs of belief formed against the background of
diverse traditions” (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 166). Understanding gover-
nance in this way requires a narrative approach, which records and criti-
cally analyses diverse “governance stories.” Such stories
explain shifting patterns of governance by focusing on the beliefs and actions
by which a host of people construct varied practices. They explore some of
the diverse ways in which situated agents are changing the boundaries of
state and civil society. (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 166)
From our in-depth qualitative research, we were able to identify three
distinct stories of faith and urban governance: the “resources” narrative of
national policy makers, the “religion” narrative of faith actors, and the “rep-
resentation” narrative of local stakeholders. Notwithstanding some internal
differentiation, the three narratives embody and express a distinctive rea-
soning regarding the purpose of faith engagement and the relationships
between the roles and activities identified in Table 1.
The elaboration of narratives involves more than just recounting actors’
own statements. Narratives are not, in Atkinson’s (2000) words, “immedi-
ately accessible” (p. 213); moreover, they may conceal as well as reveal
meaning (given that they express certain interests). The researcher is
engaged in the interpretation of interpretations (Bevir and Rhodes 2006) or
what Jameson (1989) calls an “allegorical act” (p. 10). Through the careful
coding and comparison of themes, the researcher seeks to identify different
layers of meaning in a text (an interview transcript or a policy document,
for instance) and to identify the underlying “master code” (Jameson 1989,
10) or “story line” (Hajer 1993, 47). In a process similar to triangulation,
the researcher moves closer to this through establishing “discursive affini-
ties” (Hajer 1993, 47) among a variety of texts. Observational methods are
also used to study the practices and interactions that conform to and at the
same time reproduce the narrative.
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As composite analytical constructs, our narratives are not the same as
the stories told to us by research subjects. But they are both robust and res-
onant. To establish the validity of the findings, we used peer debriefing
(with academic colleagues in our research teams) and member checking
(with interviewees in a focus group situation) (Erlandson 1993). In this
way, we were able to check that the narratives were “accurate, comprehen-
sive and consistent” (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 29) and, moreover, resonated
with the experience of those whom we were researching.
It is through the comparison of rival narratives, which now follows, that
an interpretivist methodology seeks to generate “objective” knowledge
about the issue at hand (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 28). We present the narra-
tives in textual form but also graphically, using an organizing image
(Morgan 1986). Different narratives represent different ways of seeing and
understanding the world; they are partial in both senses of the word—they
focus on just some aspects of a phenomenon, and they reflect specific inter-
ests and preferences. But as Gareth Morgan (1986) explains, “the process
of framing and reframing itself produces a qualitatively different kind of
understanding that parallels the quality of binocular vision” (p. 40).
Resources for Urban Governance: The Policy Narrative
“The church is the biggest voluntary sector organization in the country—
it’s a cheap way into anywhere.”7
We start with the policy makers’narrative, which focuses upon the resources
that faith groups can bring to urban governance. The quotation above, from a
senior civil servant, reveals a preoccupation with the untapped organizational
capacity of faith groups and with their potential role in reaching socially
excluded groups (“anywhere”). The narrative resonates with a bureaucratic
tradition that stresses hierarchical authority and functional specialism. As
Figure 1 shows, its organizing image is a pyramid.
The policy narrative sees faith communities as “repositories” (Home
Office 2004) of resources for addressing issues of public significance,
including urban governance in general and the more specific issues of com-
munity cohesion and the prevention of religious extremism. Faith group
resources may take the form of human capital (e.g., staff, volunteers, and
members), social capital (e.g., networks of trust and reciprocity), physical
capital (e.g., community buildings and venues), and financial capital (e.g.,
collections, subscriptions, and donations).
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The policy narrative is instrumentalist in its regard for faith communities
as “useful” because of what they can “produce” in terms of social “goods.”
The policy narrative understands faith communities as a general resource
for adding value in a secular context. The aim of faith engagement is to
improve the quality of urban governance; the “faithfulness” of faith com-
munities is of secondary and limited (or even no) significance. A Church of
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England activist argued forcefully that “the government doesn’t want to
hear about what makes us faithful people. They’ll fund us if we don’t do
anything religious with the money.”8
The clarity of policymakers’ goals may obscure the realities of faith
communities’ own aspirations and motivations and, in so doing, assume a
model of engagement which is not reflected in practice. The policy narra-
tive suggests that faith communities are the bedrock of other faith-related
activities that are orientated toward the policy goals outlined above. It
assumes that religious organizations naturally contribute to the formation of
networks, whether local interfaith forums or national bodies such as the
Faith Based Regeneration Network. Such networks are seen as part of a
movement toward strategic engagement with governance issues, through
faith leaders and representatives sitting as representatives of a faith sector
on urban partnerships. But the linearity of this narrative implies a neatness
and directedness within faith communities that empirical evidence suggests
is unlikely to be the case (for example, see Furbey et al. 2006). In particu-
lar, the assumption of continuity between the worshipping community and
faith leaders and representatives is, at least, contested.
Another implication of the policy narrative is that single-faith commu-
nities at the grassroots level will move toward the engagement of many
faiths as they network among each other and leaders and representatives
emerge. This is an especial concern of the community cohesion policy
agenda. This assumption may be misleading because it takes no account of
the power and capacity differentials between faith traditions. Indeed, while
engagement may be relatively easy for a large, highly organized, and well-
resourced faith tradition, such as Anglican Christians, for smaller traditions,
such as Jains, Baha’I, or Zoroastrians, involvement is likely to take a very
different character. Some faith groups may prefer to act on a single-faith
basis for practical or theological reasons.
More generally, the top-down assumptions of this narrative are con-
tested. While policy makers envisage the mobilization of faith group
resources in the pursuit of urban governance objectives, faith groups them-
selves may focus on the extent to which they can access or add value to
government resources, for instance, for new buildings, training, or project
running costs. Like all community bodies, faith groups experience difficul-
ties in recruiting volunteers because of constraints of time, skills, and con-
fidence. Donations and subscriptions can also be hard to maintain in the
context of dwindling congregations (for some faiths) and in disadvantaged
communities (in others). Buildings can become as much of a burden as an
asset to faith groups, given the costs involved in renovation and adaptation,
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especially where they are heritage buildings (Dinham and Finneron 2002
PLS PROVIDE REF OR DELETE IN-TEXT CITE).
A critical examination of the policy narrative illuminates a number of
key debates. First, the notion that faith communities are repositories of
social goods cannot be assumed. In some cases, faith communities may be
places of disconnection, insularity, and radicalism. Second, the assumed
linearity and continuity of relationships between faith communities, orga-
nizations, networks, leaders, and representatives are debatable and may be
highly differentiated between and within faith traditions. Different faith
groups also vary in terms of their capacity for engagement in urban gover-
nance and in the multifaith platforms that usually support this. Third, it is
far from established that the urban policy goals associated with faith
engagement are actually shared by people of faith themselves, whose pri-
orities and aspirations may be very different. Fourth, resources flow along
a two-way street: What are faith groups contributing toward urban gover-
nance, and what additional resources do they require to maintain, expand,
or redirect their work?
Religion and Urban Governance: The Faith Narrative
“I am doing this for the benefit of the community and what I believe in.”9
The faith narrative starts from the perspective of faith communities
themselves and while incorporating the same actors and roles, presents a
stark contrast to the policy narrative. In placing faith communities at the
center of the narrative, the priority is shifted away from a linear, goal-
oriented journey from faith communities toward social goods and on to the
various activities undertaken by faith communities as goods in themselves.
Such activities may overlap with the objectives of urban governance, but
they are motivated by religion itself, as indicated in the quotation above
from a Muslim community leader. Figure 2 shows the relationships embod-
ied in the faith narrative, using the image of a web.
Faith communities are at the center of the web, linked in two-way (and
provisional) relationships with other forms of faith-based activity (organi-
zations, networks, leadership, and representation) and with the world of
urban governance. In this narrative, people of faith engage in such activi-
ties, if at all, as a matter of personal and collective choice. Whereas the pol-
icy narrative is driven by the desire to identify and harness faith group
resources in pursuit of urban governance goals, the faith narrative places such
goals in the context of their own broad repertoire of internal and external
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aspirations. There is no necessary or even obvious connection between faith
activity and urban governance.
In this narrative, there is no assumption that those who believe or wor-
ship are also members of faith-based organizations or active as community
networkers. These linkages are contingent and context specific. Similarly,
those engaged in faith leadership and representation do not have taken-for-
granted connections with faith communities. Leaders cannot assume that
they have authority vested in them (and the knowledge and contacts to exer-
cise this effectively) simply because they are at the top of a pyramid of ever-
more specialized roles. This narrative is not premised upon the existence of
a coherent and structured faith sector. Indeed, a comparison of the religion
and resources narratives suggests that the faith sector is essentially a dis-
cursive construction of policy makers
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In this narrative, the focus—unsurprisingly perhaps—is on religion. The
faith community is seen primarily as a place of belief, worship, and fel-
lowship rather than as a repository of resources for the pursuit of policy
goals. Faith communities may engage in projects and associations, net-
works and partnerships, or any combination of these. They may produce
leaders and representatives in public spaces. But their goals are highly vari-
able and derive from the primary fact of being in or of a faith community
rather than being policy or socially oriented. Thus, in Figure 2, examples of
possible goals are given in two spheres—external and internal.
Goals in the external sphere may relate to the extension of the faith com-
munity evangelically. Where goals are linked to public policy, it cannot be
assumed that faith actors will adopt the linear reasoning of the policy nar-
rative. Indeed, Furbey (2006) has contrasted “cuddlesome” and “trouble-
some” (p. 1) faith engagement: The former are willing partners and
consultees in urban governance, while the latter are oriented toward critical
campaigning and self-organization in pursuit of broader social justice
goals. But of course, faith communities may not be externally oriented at
all. Their goals may be within the internal sphere alone, focusing on the
faith community itself: on the relationships, fellowship, prayer life, or spir-
ituality of the community and its members. But what links the internal and
external goals of faith communities is their value base. In our research, faith
actors explained their involvement in urban governance in terms of the
“outworking of their faith.”10 As an LSP faith representative put it, “it is
the values that come from being a member of a faith that is important, the
belonging, the discipline . . .”11 This is the “spiritual capital” identified by
Chris Baker (2007, 5), which has the potential (but not inevitable) capacity
to galvanize practical contributions to the wider public realm.
An example of the faith narrative is provided by the report from the
Commission on Faith and Urban Life, Faithful Cities, which proposes a
“value-driven approach” to “building the good city” (Commission on
Urban Life and Faith 2006, 62). The report argues that fundamental ques-
tions about what makes a fulfilling human community are generally
avoided by policy makers, despite their language of “sustainable communi-
ties.” The faith narrative exhibits a degree of reflexivity not present else-
where. There is an awareness of the importance of language and culture and
of its potentially oppositional nature. As Faithful Cities puts it, “the lan-
guage of ‘love,’ ‘hope,’ ‘judgement,’ ‘forgiveness,’ ‘remembrance’ and ‘hos-
pitality’ combine to form a distinctive ‘story’ . . . that challenges dominant
definitions in public policy” (Commission on Urban Life and Faith 2006,
3). Interestingly, we found a high degree of convergence among different
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faiths in relation to the specific values identified as relevant to their engage-
ment in urban governance.
Involving faith groups in urban governance brings with it an explicit
debate about values—and the possibility (even likelihood) of value conflict.
Such debates may challenge policy makers and practitioners because they
surface values that are usually submerged for political reasons (e.g., the redis-
tributive aspects of some government policy) or because they involve a direct
challenge to public policy norms (from equal opportunities to short-term
target-driven funding). Policy makers and practitioners are often uncomfortable
with discussing values head-on, especially where explicit reference is made
to religion. This is not to say that values are not important to policy makers.
But there is clearly a dissonance between understated secular notions of a
public service ethos (or alternatively, a commitment to market-oriented effi-
ciency) and the vocalization of religious belief as a reason for and guide to
public action. This vocalization may be one of the distinctive contributions
that faiths make in their involvement in urban governance.
Faith engagement has the capacity to introduce what Janet Newman
(2007) calls “troubling issues” (p. 27) into the public realm. Those involved
in urban governance are not used to confronting issues of “the body, dress
and comportment” (Newman 2007, 36). Will they want to pray? Do they
need special food? Might she be wearing a veil? Do we need to take our
shoes off? When are their festival days? Such questions illuminate the con-
structed nature of policy makers’ own narratives—around the conduct of
formal meetings, practices of informal networking, matters of status, and
personal relations—and the ways in which these too can be exclusive and
threatening to the outsider, including faith activists. At another level, such
questions also raise the profile of personal and social issues that are unfa-
miliar in public space. What is the human dimension here? How will this
contribute to people’s sense of happiness? What are the choices that we
ought to be making in the service of the “good” society?
Our research revealed a certain amount of cynicism among faith actors
about the attempts of policy makers (and local practitioners) to hijack the
normative agenda—for instance, claiming grassroots legitimacy on the
basis of faith group involvement, without actually engaging with the values
and practices of those groups. At the same time, some faith group repre-
sentatives expressed concern that involvement with the institutions of
urban governance could “corrupt” people of faith, distracting them from
more fundamental goals. Indeed, the London Churches Group (2002)
acknowledges that some faith groups do not regard such work as within
their “calling” (p. 20).
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As we noted at the start of the article, new governance stories tend to
break the bounds of normal policy discourse and in so doing, reveal the sit-
uated character of dominant narrative traditions. The faith narrative is espe-
cially provocative because of the challenge it presents to the established
public/private boundary. It provides a lucid exemplar of Newman’s (2007,
27) “rethinking the public” thesis. The faith narrative is, in effect, part of a
wider civil society movement to “re-inscribe the public domain with values
associated with the private and personal spheres” (Newman 2007, 33),
although some faith actors may consider counterparts within, for example,
feminist and gay movements to be unlikely coconspirators.
Representation in Urban Governance:
The Partnership Narrative
“Faith-based organizations are trusted by people who would not trust,
and would not approach, or even think of going to a statutory or another
voluntary organization.”12
The third narrative starts from the perspective of faith communities as
participants in local partnerships and is evident in the discourse of local
stakeholders from the public, private, and voluntary and community sec-
tors. The quotation above, from the secretary of an interfaith forum, identi-
fies faith bodies as representing a specific (and hitherto marginalized)
constituency within urban governance. Government advice on partnership
formation in disadvantaged urban localities argues for
the need to incorporate the diversity of society into the mainstream. Faith
communities represent a significant element of diversity—both by virtue of
straightforward variety of faiths and because of the overlap between faith and
ethnic or cultural identity. (New Deal for Communities 2000, 6)
This narrative is framed in the assumptions of what we have called else-
where the “new local corporatism” (Lowndes and Sullivan 2004, 60),
which binds the representatives of different interest or identity groups into
a collective decision-making process. Local partnerships echo the best aspi-
rations of national-level corporatist arrangements: the opportunity for inclu-
sion of previously excluded stakeholders and the principles of consensus-
building and shared ownership of decision making. But they also express
some of the less realistic assumptions of the corporatist discourse, namely,
that disparate individuals can be represented (and, indeed, disciplined) by
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representatives of umbrella organizations and that less powerful stakehold-
ers will be able to exercise significant influence in the face of powerful
vested interests (Lowndes and Sullivan 2004, 60-61).
The image of the partnership narrative is an orange, with segments rep-
resenting different stakeholders (see Figure 3). The assumption is that these
fit together neatly within a skin of shared urban policy goals. Each segment
has a distinct identity but something more than the sum of the parts is cre-
ated when they are placed together. As Chris Huxham (1996) has argued
about partnership governance, “working together offers organizations the
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possibility for improved delivery of objectives, and the creation of new
(often unanticipated) opportunities” (p. 1).
The partnership narrative assumes that the segments of the orange can be
divided easily into three chunks—the public sector segment (the elected
local council and other agencies such as health and police), the business
segment (local companies, chambers of commerce, and privatized providers
of urban services), and the community segment (including not-for-profit
service providers, self-help and community action projects, and citizen
groups). Faith engagement is seen within this narrative as one of the
(newer) segments within the community chunk. Faith involvement may be
seen as helping to diversify community representation, particularly in local-
ities with high concentrations of minority faiths. Including faith actors is
part of an attempt to go beyond the “usual suspects” in the community sec-
tor and to challenge the hold of professionalized “voluntary organizations”
upon community representation (though many faith-based activities already
understand themselves as existing within this professionalized domain).
At the same time, in some very deprived White working-class commu-
nities, such voluntary organizations may be notable by their absence.
Indeed, the local Church of England vicar may be the only “community
representative” left on a rundown housing estate. As someone with a
stipend and a building and (at least some) links into the community, the
vicar may play a key role in partnership activity in such areas.
Urban partnerships exist at many levels—from the LSP charged with the
strategic governance of an entire city to a neighborhood-level partnership
aiming to tackle antisocial behavior. As Figure 3 shows, the partnership
narrative encompasses all these different levels: Faith communities are the
pips at the center of the orange, with faith organizations, faith networks,
faith leaders, and faith representatives all present on outer layers. Those
actors nearer the external skin are those most concerned on a day-to-day
level with matters of urban governance, working alongside leaders and rep-
resentatives from the wider community sector and from government and
business. At the same time, faith communities and faith organizations near
the center also have their own partnership counterparts: community activists
or front-line public servants and local entrepreneurs, operating near the skin
but residing throughout. So when the Bishop of Leicester (for instance) sits
on the LSP, there is an assumption that he has a relationship with faith com-
munities (as his constituency) but also that faith actors at the neighborhood
level will themselves be engaged in more local partnership activity.
The partnership narrative sees faith engagement as “topping up” or extend-
ing community representation. It aspires to better urban governance through
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greater social inclusion, drawing upon the specific knowledge, skills, and
authority of faith leaders and representatives. The aim, in the words of a senior
civil servant, is to “plug the governance deficit”13 in areas of multiple disad-
vantage where community leadership and citizen participation have tradition-
ally been weak. Faith involvement is also increasingly linked to a search for
better “community intelligence” about extremist threats within minority faith
communities. The partnership narrative stresses the benefits of engaging mod-
erates and of using this leverage to nurture a sense of collective belonging and
civic responsibility within (specifically Muslim) communities.
The partnership narrative is open to criticism by those who question the
representativeness of faith leaders. Indeed, those who sit on partnership bod-
ies are themselves aware of these difficulties; as one LSP faith representative
(from a Jewish background) explained, “my main difficulty is actually hav-
ing sufficient contact with faith groups and getting feedback from them as to
what they want and what they are interested in.”14 In this way, this narrative
risks implying a linear relationship between worshipping communities at one
end and faith leaders and representatives at the other. It assumes the existence
of a faith constituency, but we know that in reality, there are many different
interests and identities at stake. The LSP representative argued that it is nec-
essary to establish “a common denominator” and to ensure that a local faith
network is more that just a “database of people.”15 A key difficulty is in estab-
lishing something of value that is not simply a lowest common denominator.
We encountered suspicion from nonfaith stakeholders that representatives
only “looked after their own community”; there were also frequent comments
that younger people and women were not properly consulted. Faith actors
themselves also disputed what constitutes legitimate representation. For
example, an activist from the Sikh community argued that “professional”
Church of England representatives (clergy) were not really community
leaders in the sense of being selected from within the community and
accountable to it. He also expressed the view that Hindu leaders were almost
exclusively from the Brahmin caste.16
Faith is a good example of the new “imaginaries of representation”
which accompany “new spaces of deliberative, participative and commu-
nity politics” (Newman 2005, 205). But, as Newman goes on to argue, we
should not simply equate these imaginaries with “an expanded form of
democracy” but rather question “their implications for patterns of inclu-
sion, exclusion, voicing and silencing and for the reconstitution of identities
and interests” (Newman 2005, 205). The notion that this might add up to
something representative of faiths risks concealing many of those voices
behind the impression that they have been heard. A Muslim leader suggested
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to us that the idea of a faith sector was best regarded in aspirational terms:
“At some time in the future, you may well have something that’s a faith sec-
tor, where people who believe in a higher spiritual being can come
together.”17 Another Muslim activist concluded that “It is a dilemma for
government. . . . Who do you speak to and how do you ascertain that they’re
an authentic voice? . . . Maybe it’s just about speaking to lots of different
people rather than trying to speak to one person only.”18
Toward a New Discourse Coalition?
This article has reviewed the policy context for faith engagement in
British urban governance. It has also sought to specify the different roles
and activities through which people of faith become engaged, differentiat-
ing between faith communities, faith organizations, faith networks, faith
leaders, and faith representatives. The article has questioned the idea of a
homogenous faith sector able (or willing) to act in an autonomous and stan-
dardized fashion within the public policy arena. Drawing on the concepts
of situated agency and narrative tradition, we have argued that faith engage-
ment is understood differently by different stakeholders—faith communi-
ties themselves, national policy makers, and local partners. There is, as yet,
no shared paradigm. Different stakeholders tell quite different stories about
faith engagement, each making specific assumptions about the way in
which beliefs, actions, and institutions are linked. Three narratives have
been explored, with the recognition that each is itself internally differenti-
ated (between and within faith communities). These patterns of differentia-
tion are a topic for further research.
Our study of faith engagement has wider relevance for understanding
urban governance. Bevir and Rhodes (2006) argue that contemporary gov-
ernance does not have a defining essence but is best understood through
“decentred studies of the diverse practices of which it consists” (p. 169)
They propose that such studies should focus upon varied political actors
and political practices—from prime ministers to individual citizens, from
parliaments to forms of protest. Our research is offered in this spirit.
Governance stories are played out by Methodists and mullahs as well as
councillors and cabinets.
The “strange” case of faith engagement casts light upon the dynamics of
British urban governance more generally. The explicit challenge presented
by faith engagement disrupts the discursive common sense of urban gover-
nance. In so doing, it reveals the specificity (and contestability) of dominant
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assumptions and behaviors. Faith engagement breaks “the bounds of nor-
mal discourse” (Morgan 1986, 11) in urban governance. Indeed, the case
illuminates the narrative dissonance that is at the heart of the new urban
governance, as it brings together an evermore diverse cast of actors from
different social, economic, and cultural milieus.
Faith engagement is a critical case in understanding the ongoing rene-
gotiation of boundaries between the state and civil society and between the
public, private, and personal. The passion of the faith discourse provides a
sharp contrast to the instrumentalism of the policy narrative and the man-
agerialism of the partnership story. Faith actors are a disruptive presence at
the urban governance table. Faith narratives challenge the assumptions of a
“domain of rational deliberation that can be clearly marked from the pas-
sions and pleasures of the personal” (Newman 2007, 31). Faith engagement
challenges dominant assumptions about what constitutes good governance.
Perhaps trust is as important as accountability? How can long-term com-
mitment be balanced against short-term performance targets? Could claims
of social justice trump those of due process? Can policy take account of
joined-up people as well as of joined-up government?
Our analysis of faith engagement suggests that narrative dissonance may
actually prove to be a positive phenomenon within urban governance.
Concepts of situated agency and narrative tradition are not intended to
imply that actors are fixed or stuck in their specific discourses. As Bevir and
Rhodes (2006) note, “change arises as situated agents respond to novel
ideas or problems” (p. 5). Individuals pursue beliefs and perform actions
through a reasoning that is embedded in the tradition they inherit but that is
also shaped by interactions with other narrative traditions and social con-
texts. The existence of multiple narratives is not necessarily a negative phe-
nomenon; over time, they may form the building blocks of a new “discourse
coalition” (Hajer 1993, 47). The encounter between faith actors and those
more normally associated with urban governance may yet prove productive
in the fashioning of what Newman (2007) calls a new “public imaginary”
(p. 42) and Rhodes (1997) a “new governing code” (p. 110). But surfacing
different narratives and interrogating the tensions between them is a vital
first step in seeking to harness that potential creativity.
Notes
1. Faith engagement in governance has received very little scholarly attention in compar-
ison to faith-based service delivery, where there exists a major body of work, albeit focused
on the United States. For an analysis of national-level strategies, see Dionne and Chen (2001),
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Formicola, Segers, and Weber (2003), Black, Koopman, and Ryden (2004), and Wuthnow
(2004). For urban and community-based research, see Vidal (2001), Sherman (2002), Canada
(2003), and Government Accountability Office (2006).
2. See 2001 census, Leicester City Council Web site, www.leicester.gov.uk/your-council—
services/council-and-democracy/city-statistics (accessed January 31, 2008).
3. Gerry Stoker (1995) argues that this “blending of capacities between governmental and
non-governmental actors” (p. 69) is akin to processes associated with urban regime theory.
More recently, Jonathan Davies (2004) has counseled against such “conceptual stretching” on
the basis that British urban partnerships are characterized by limited business engagement and
tight control by central government (pp. 30-31). Clarence Stone (2004) proposes that such part-
nerships may constitute “weak regimes,” in the context of a comparative research agenda that
focuses on how “governing arrangements take shape” in different urban contexts (pp. 9-12).
4. Comparisons with the United States are interesting here. Religious commitment fea-
tures far less in the rhetoric of British politics. As one of Tony Blair’s closest advisers, Alistair
Campbell, famously put it, “We don’t do God” (http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/
story/0,6903,949023,00.html [accessed January 31, 2008]). But at the same time, there is less
anxiety about breaching the “wall” between church and state (Towey 2004, 212). Although a
far more secular society than the United States, Britain has an established church with a con-
stitutional role, including the presence of Bishops in the House of Lords. It appears that the
historic permeability of the church-state boundary may make the inclusion of faith actors in
urban governance (over and above service contracting) more acceptable, even (ironically)
where these actors come from non-Christian faiths. Indeed, a comparative European study has
linked relatively high levels of “state accommodation of Muslims” to the specific character of
church-state relations in Britain (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 146-47). Thanks to Professor Ken
Wald, University of Florida, for drawing our attention to this point when we presented an ear-
lier version of the article at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Chicago, August 30-September 2, 2007.
5. Further methodological details (including topic guides) can be found in an appendix to
the full research report at http://www.dmu.ac.uk/faculties/business_and_law/business/research/
lgru/lgru_faith_groups.jsp (accessed February 8, 2008).
6. Further methodological details (including topic guides) can be found in an appendix to
the full research report at www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/9781861348388.pdf (accessed
February 8, 2008).
7. Interview with civil servant in Department of Communities and Local Government,
February 2005.
8. Interview with Church of England activist, February 2005.
9. Interview with Muslim community leader, February 2005.
10. Interview with Church of England activist, February 2005.
11. Interview with Local Strategic Partnership faith representative, February 2005.
12. Interview with Council of Faiths representative, February 2005.
13. Interview with civil servant in U.K. Home Office, February 2005.
14. Interview with Council of Faiths representative, February 2005.
15. Interview with Council of Faiths representative, February 2005.
16. Interview with Sikh community leader, February 2005.
17. Interview with Muslim community leader, February 2005.
18. Interview with Muslim community activist, February 2005.
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